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Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of managerial entrenchment 
on private placements by examining the firm's decision to appoint 
representatives of the private investors to the board without shareholder 
approval. By analyzing a sample of U.S. firms that appoint directors in 
combination with private offerings between 1995 and 2000, we find that firms 
with greater managerial entrenchment are more likely to bypass shareholder 
approval. Firms that bypass shareholders are less likely to appoint 
independent directors or to elect one of these directors as chairman. We also 
show that the market reacts more positively to the private offering 
announcement when the firm submits its board candidates for shareholder 
approval. Further, firms that bypass approval underperform compared to 
firms that obtain it. Overall our findings suggest that managers avoid 
shareholder approval to perpetuate entrenchment.  
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1. Introduction  
The conventional view of private equity placements as a 
mechanism to enhance external monitoring has been recently 
challenged by studies arguing that managers can use private 
placements to promote their own entrenchment (i.e., Wu (2004) and 
Barclay et al. (2007-this issue)). In this paper we contribute to the 
debate over the governance implications of private placements by 
analyzing a heretofore unexamined aspect of that process. Specifically, 
we examine the decision to appoint representatives of private 
investors to the firm's board of directors without a vote of the 
shareholders.  
Wruck (1989) finds that private placements in which investors 
are appointed to the board are characterized by significantly lower 
announcement period returns. She conjectures that the appointment 
of these individuals without shareholder approval might be the cause 
of the lower returns. This study tests her conjecture and provides an 
estimate of value of shareholder participation in the selection of a 
firm's board of directors. Such analysis has important implications for 
corporate governance, especially in environments where super-voting 
rights might exist or external equity investors are otherwise 
disadvantaged.  
Our analysis of the circumvention of shareholder approval for 
the appointment of directors also contributes to a continuing policy 
debate regarding the extent of shareholder power in the director 
election process and the role of independent directors. Even though a 
2003 SEC proposal on this issue stalled due to the opposition of senior 
industry executives, by early 2006 some firms have implemented 
changes in their bylaws to increase shareholder power during the 
director election process. These changes are consistent with the 
position advocated by activist shareholders and various legal 
academics.2 Further, since this research examines the effects resulting 
from the nullification of a basic shareholder right, it benchmarks the 
impact that violation, of one share-one vote rules might have on firms 
in countries with weak protection of shareholder interests.  
Wruck (1989) suggests that the appointment of directors without 
shareholder approval at the time of a private offering might imply 
managerial entrenchment. According to this view, managers bypass 
shareholders and appoint to the board individuals who are aligned with 
current management and unlikely to provide independent monitoring. 
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Such directors are likely to be less effective monitors than those who 
are regularly elected by shareholders. Barclay et al. (2007-this issue) 
and Wu (2004) argue that firms are more likely to privately place 
securities with investors who promise to vote their shares in managers' 
favor and consequently protect managers' positions. If true, this is 
more likely to occur when firms assign directorships to representatives 
of these private investors. As long as entrenched managers estimate 
the probability that shareholders will oppose their slate of board 
candidates to be greater than zero, they will more likely circumvent 
the shareholder election process to appoint "friendly" investors to the 
board.3 We call this the entrenchment hypothesis.  
Berle and Means (1932) and more recently Demb and Neubauer 
(1992) and Lorsch (1989), question the importance of shareholder 
voting for directors since the firm's proxy committee is appointed by 
the existing management and the proxy slate is usually elected, 
resulting in management virtually "dictating their own successors". 
Although state corporate law requires that shareholders select the 
board of directors, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1989) observe that even 
in the extreme case of a proxy fight, shareholders win board seats only 
one-third of the time. Bebchuck (2003) contends that shareholders 
seeking to exercise their right to replace directors face substantial 
obstacles and that, apart from hostile takeovers, the incidence of 
shareholder challenges to directors is negligible. Since shareholders 
virtually always vote for management's slate of candidates, managers 
might estimate the probability that shareholders will reject their slate 
of candidates to be zero. If true, managers do not need to circumvent 
shareholders to perpetuate entrenchment, and the firm's decision to 
bypass shareholders would not be symptomatic of weak corporate 
governance. We call this the approval irrelevance hypothesis.  
A third possibility might be that managers bypass shareholder 
approval when private investors demand immediate board 
representation as a condition for providing capital because of concern 
about managerial exploitation of firm resources and consumption of 
agency perquisites. If true, companies that bypass shareholder 
approval might be characterized ex-ante by poor corporate 
governance, but will more likely increase the monitoring quality of the 
board at the time of the private placement. We call this the monitoring 
hypothesis.4  
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We test these three competing hypothesis by analyzing a 
sample of U.S. firms that appoint directors in combination with private 
offerings between 1995 and 2000. We find that firms in which 
managers are entrenched are more likely to bypass shareholder 
approval of board appointments at the time of the private placement. 
Firms that bypass shareholders are less likely to appoint independent 
directors or to elect a new independent director as chairman of the 
board. We also find that the stock market reacts more positively to the 
announcement of the private offering when the firm submits board 
candidates for shareholder approval. Further, we show that firms that 
bypass shareholder approval significantly underperform after the 
private offering compared to firms that obtain shareholder approval. 
We conclude from our findings that the firm's decision to circumvent 
shareholder ratification is most consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis.  
 
2. The role of shareholder voting in corporate 
governance  
The right of shareholders to vote for the members of the board 
of directors provides an important connection between ownership and 
control. As described by Fama and Jensen (1983), ratification and 
monitoring are two important steps in the decision process of a 
corporation. The approval of directorships by the shareholders is a 
fundamental element of these ratification and monitoring steps.  
Shareholder voting rights are considered by the financial contracting 
literature as a valid alternative to contracts. Grossman and Hart 
(1986), Hart and Moore (1988) and Hart and Moore (1990) contend 
that contracts cannot specify all future contingencies and that voting 
rights might offer a partial remedy since they can be used to ratify 
decisions ex-post. Moreover, Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Kaplan 
and Stromberg (2003) note that voting rights can shift between 
managers and outside investors depending on the firm's financial 
performance.  
Even though shareholder voting to approve board proposals is a 
fundamental shareholder right, does it make a difference? Berle and 
Means (1932) argue that diffuse ownership decreases shareholder 
incentive to vote or to otherwise attempt to influence corporate 
decisions, thus resulting in the approval of management proposals in 
most circumstances. Alternatively, Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September 2007): pg. 485-510. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
5 
 
argue that shareholder voting rights are an effective monitoring tool. 
Bethel and Gillan (2002) show that for non-routine proposals (i.e., 
when brokers cannot vote on behalf of shareholders) a larger number 
of votes is cast against management. However routine management 
proposals are usually ratified, providing managers with the incentive to 
classify a proposal as "routine" to increase the likelihood of approval. 
Burch et al. (2004) analyze acquiring firm merger proxies and find that 
many deals are only narrowly approved, suggesting that shareholder 
voting rights are not merely perfunctory. Balachandran et al. (2004) 
empirically analyze the causes and consequences of shareholder voting 
rights and find that firms with poor performance and weak internal 
governance tend to adopt equity-based compensation plans without 
shareholder approval. These firms also tend to continue their poor 
performance even after the adoption of the compensation plan.  
 
3. How do firms appoint directors without 
shareholder approval?  
Firms that plan to issue securities privately and appoint 
representatives of these private purchasers to the board might ask for 
shareholder approval of the security issuance as well as the director 
nominees. Even though this study focuses on shareholder approval of 
the directorships, we also consider the approval of the security 
issuance since in the context of private offerings these are often 
related actions.  
 
3.1. Private security issuance without shareholder 
approval  
If the number of authorized common shares in the firm's 
certificate of incorporation is larger than the number of shares 
outstanding, the firm can issue common stock without shareholder 
approval unless required by the listing exchange. Moreover, a firm can 
issue convertible preferred shares without shareholder approval if it 
has a blank check preferred stock provision in its certificate of 
incorporation. A blank check preferred stock provision gives directors 
the discretion to issue preferred stock with particular voting, dividend, 
conversion and other rights without shareholder approval. Firms 
without such a provision in their charter can issue a new class of 
preferred stock only with shareholder approval. A company might also 
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avoid shareholder approval by issuing convertible notes instead of 
common equity or preferred stock since convertible notes do not 
require shareholder approval at the time of the issue.5  
There are cases, however, in which the listing exchange requires 
shareholder approval even when the common shares are already 
authorized, a blank check preferred stock provision is present in the 
certificate of incorporation, or convertible notes are issued. The New 
York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and AMEX require shareholder 
approval when the issuance of common stock or securities exercisable 
or convertible into common stock is at least 20% of the common stock 
or at least 20% of the voting power outstanding prior to the issuance 
and is sold for less than the greater of book or market value of the 
stock.6  
 
3.2. Board appointments without shareholder approval  
Usually the bylaws of a corporation do not require a specific 
number of directors. More typically, they indicate a range such as "the 
board of directors shall consist of no less than five, and no more than 
ten members". In this case, the existing directors can add new 
directors to the board without shareholder approval and without 
amending the bylaws. If the addition of the new directors increases the 
board size beyond the upper limit, the board can usually increase the 
maximum number of directors without shareholder approval by 
amending the bylaws.7  
Another method that allows the appointment of directors 
without shareholder approval is by replacement. The resignation of a 
director creates a vacancy on the board that can be filled by a new 
director without approval from shareholders. Firms can use these two 
methods independently from a private offering to obtain the 
appointments they seek. Firms, however, typically use these 
stratagems in connection with private placements.  
A strategy to bypass shareholders that requires the private 
placement of securities can be implemented by issuing blank check 
preferred securities, such as convertible preferred shares, that allow 
investors to elect one or more directors. If a blank check preferred 
stock provision is already present in the charter, no approval is 
required to issue these securities. Although directors would have the 
right to bypass shareholder approval under these conditions, the 
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decision to do so must be weighed against their fiduciary 
responsibilities towards shareholders.8  
The duration over which shareholder approval of board 
nominees is denied varies. Private purchasers of convertible securities 
often have the special right to elect a certain number of directors 
separately from common shareholders. In this case, shareholders are 
circumvented indefinitely. If, however, the board adds new directors 
because of the flexibility provided by the bylaws and the private 
purchasers lack special voting rights, common shareholders must 
ratify these appointments by election in a subsequent annual meeting. 
If the board is not staggered, the election occurs not later than twelve 
months after the private placement; if the board is staggered, 
shareholders might have to wait as long as three years before voting 
to ratify the directors' appointments.  
It is also important to note that the approval of board 
appointments in connection with private placements is more 
discretionary than the approval of securities. For example, exchange 
rules require shareholder approval of security issuances as described 
earlier, but do not require the approval of directors. In essence, a firm 
that asks shareholders to approve the private offering of new 
securities does so because it is required, but a firm that asks 
shareholders to approve the appointment of new directors in 
connection with a private placement does so voluntarily.  
 
3.3. The relation between approval of security issuance 
and approval of board appointments  
The approval of securities and the approval of board 
appointments are sometimes interrelated. If a firm does not have a 
blank check preferred stock provision in its charter, it must ask for 
shareholder approval to issue preferred convertible shares. In the 
proxy sent to investors, the company usually specifies the rights 
associated with these securities. One of these rights might be the right 
of preferred convertible stockholders to elect one or more directors in 
addition to the directors regularly elected by common shareholders. In 
this case, shareholders approve the issuance of convertible preferred 
shares, while simultaneously permitting the firm and the private 
investors to appoint directors.  
When firms decide to privately issue more than 20% of their 
fully diluted common stock and ask authorization from shareholders as 
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required by exchange rules, they often simultaneously declare their 
intention to appoint directors and report the names of the appointees 
in the proxy. In such case, the firm's shareholders implicitly approve 
the board appointments when they vote in favor of the private 
offering.  
A firm can circumvent the exchange rules that require 
shareholder approval by issuing less than 20% of the common stock. 
In this case, the firm does not have to submit the security issuance 
and the director nominees for shareholder approval. A few months 
later, the firm asks for shareholder approval to sell the remaining 
amount of equity it desires. The directors, however, are already 
appointed and do not require shareholder approval.  
 
4. Data and sample characteristics  
4.1. A sample construction  
We search Factiva for press releases that announce private 
placements associated with board appointments for U.S. firms 
between January 1995 to December 2000. We identify 185 placements 
distributed over 181 unique firms that are covered by both CRSP and 
Compustat at the time of the offering. For the four firms that privately 
issue securities and grant directorships twice in our sample period, we 
remove the second placement from our sample to eliminate potential 
autocorrelation in our multivariate analysis. We collect issue 
characteristics from 8-K and SC-13D filings, board characteristics, 
insider ownership, and blockholder ownership from proxy statements, 
institutional ownership from Compact Disclosure, accounting data from 
Compustat, and stock prices and returns from CRSP. We list all 
variables and their definitions in the Appendix.  
We determine if a firm asks for shareholder approval of board 
appointments in connection with the private placement by examining 
press releases, 8-K filings, and proxy statements. A firm can seek 
shareholder approval for its board candidates in two ways. First, the 
firm can place representatives of the private investor on the slate for 
the annual meeting election that follows the date of the private 
placement. Alternatively, if the firm issues preferred stock but needs 
to ask for shareholder approval because of the absence of a blank 
check preferred stock provision, it may specify in the proxy the right of 
preferred stockholders to elect directors in addition to those elected by 
common shareholder. When common shareholders then approve the 
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preferred stock issuance, they also approve the appointment of 
directors by the private investors.  
 
4.2. Sample characteristics  
As reported in Panel A of Table 1, the majority of the sample 
firms trade on NASDAQ (74.6%). Fisher's exact test of homogeneity 
shows that firms asking for shareholder approval of board 
appointments differ significantly in their distribution across stock 
exchanges from firms not asking for shareholder approval. Firms that 
trade on the NYSE are more likely to seek approval (29.4% versus 
9.5%).  
Panels B through F of Table 1 examine various characteristics of 
our sample security issuances. The securities offered in the private 
placements are generally common shares (38.4%) and convertible 
preferred shares (42.2%). The majority of the private security issues 
in our sample is not approved by shareholders (65.7%), and has 
private equity firms as the private purchasers (60.0%). Almost half of 
the offerings are associated with one board appointment (49.2%), but 
not infrequently, private issues are connected with radical board 
restructurings. Indeed, seven placements in our sample are associated 
with the appointment of five or more directors. In most cases, firms 
increase the size of their boards by appointing additional directors 
(63.2%). In 28% of the cases, however, firms replace some of the 
existing directors with representatives of the private investors. This 
form of board restructuring does not change the size of the board. In a 
few cases (8.6%), firms simultaneously replace and add directors.  
The most noticeable difference between the approval/non-
approval subsamples is that firms that issue convertible preferred 
shares and appoint a larger number of directors are more likely to 
seek shareholder approval for their appointments. As mentioned in 
Section 4.1, firms without a blank check provision in their charters that 
desire to issue preferred shares with special rights typically present 
the security issuance agreement in the proxy and submit it to the vote 
of shareholders. Common shareholders approve the right of preferred 
shareholders to appoint directors at the time they ratify the issuance 
of the preferred shares since that is one of the rights specified in the 
proxy. This particular approval mechanism explains why a higher 
percentage of convertible preferred share issues is associated with 
shareholder approval of board appointments. As shown by Panel C of 
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Table 1, firms that ask for shareholder approval of privately placed 
securities are also more likely to seek shareholder approval of board 
appointments.  
In Table 2 we present the mean (median) value of firm 
characteristics, issue characteristics, governance, and past 
performance variables for the full sample as well as the approval/non-
approval subsamples. The mean (median) value of total assets for the 
full sample is $217.0 million ($47.3 million), and the mean (median) 
market capitalization is $182.8 million ($53.4 million). The mean 
(median) age, measured as the number of years that elapse between 
the date of the CRSP listing and the issue date, is 6.17 years (4.14 
years). These results are consistent with Wu (2004) who observes that 
firms that privately place securities usually have just recently gone 
public and are still small.  
Our measure of free cash flow is calculated as in Lehn and 
Poulsen (1989) and standardized by total assets (Freecash/assets). 
The mean (median) of Freecash/assets is -$0.23 million (-$0.04 
million), indicating that about half of our sample firms have negative 
free cash flow.  
On average, the fraction of common shares privately placed is 
26%. The gross proceeds have a mean (median) of $46.74 million 
($10 million). The fraction of shares placed is larger than those 
presented by Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993), and Wu (2004) 
for two possible reasons. First, we include in our sample only private 
placements associated with board appointments which, ceteris paribus, 
are expected to be larger in size than private placements not 
associated with board appointments. Second, we calculate the fraction 
placed by converting all convertible securities distributed to private 
investors, including warrants, into common stock.  
We find that, on average, firms appoint 1.89 directors at the 
time of the private placement; this changes the composition of 25% of 
the board. The mean (median) board size is 6.53 (6). The small size of 
the board of directors for the average firm in our sample is not 
surprising given the small size and youth of our sample firms. The CEO 
is also the chairman of the board in slightly more than half of the 
sample firms (54%). The CEO is the founder of 33% of the sample 
firms. In 68% of the sample firms the chairman is one of the top 
managers. On average, insiders hold 32% of the board seats and own 
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22% of the outstanding shares of the company. Institutional investors, 
on average, own 20% of the firm's outstanding shares.  
The summary statistics relative to past performance presented 
in Panel D suggest that, on average, the firms in our sample tend to 
underperform in the year prior to the private placement. Both the 
average return on assets for the fiscal year preceding the year of the 
private placement, and the buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns for 
the year preceding the private placement are negative (-0.31 and -
17%, respectively). After correcting for the industry median, Q has a 
positive mean (1.02), but a negative median (-0.06).  
The results presented in Table 2 reveals a number of differences 
between firms seeking and firms circumventing shareholder approval 
of board appointments. Firms that do not ask for approval are 
significantly smaller, younger, distribute a lower portion of equity to 
private investors in exchange for a smaller dollar amount, and appoint 
a smaller number of directors. The two subsamples also differ along a 
variety of governance dimensions. Firms that circumvent shareholder 
approval of board appointments are characterized by a smaller board 
prior to the placement, are more likely to have an insider as chairman, 
have a higher proportion of insiders on the board, and have a lower 
percentage of the outstanding equity owned by institutional investors. 
Aside from board size, these differences in governance characteristics 
are consistent with the hypothesis that entrenched managers are more 
likely to avoid shareholder approval of board appointments at the time 
of a private offering.  
The only performance variable that is significantly different 
between the two subsamples is Q. Firms that ask for shareholder 
approval are characterized by a lower Q in the year preceding the 
issue. Since Q is also a measure of growth opportunities, and the firms 
in the approval subsample are significantly larger and older, this result 
is not unexpected.  
 
5. Determinants of shareholder approval  
Firms have the discretion to ask shareholders to approve the 
board appointment of representatives of the private purchasers. The 
entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses suggest that when internal 
control mechanisms are weak and agency problems are severe, firms 
are more likely to bypass shareholder approval. According to the 
approval irrelevance hypothesis, shareholder approval does not 
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guarantee that the appointed directors will promote the interests of 
shareholders and the firm might decide to avoid approval only to 
reduce costs.  
To investigate the possible motivations behind the decision to 
ask for shareholder approval, we estimate a probit regression in which 
the dependent variable is equal to one when the firm asks for 
shareholder approval of board appointments and is zero otherwise. 
The independent variables are the measures of internal and external 
monitoring quality, past performance, firm characteristics, and issue 
characteristics reported in Table 2.  
The first two models of Table 3 reveal that when the chairman is 
one of the top managers of the firm (lnsiderchair), the company is less 
likely to ask for shareholder approval.9 Other board characteristics 
such as board size and the percentage of insiders on the board do not 
have a significant relation with approval. The Insiderchair variable 
remains highly significant even after controlling for firm size (Lnassets) 
and issue size (Fraction_placed). Other variables that are significantly 
different between the approval/non-approval subsamples in the 
univariate tests such as institutional ownership, number of directors 
appointed, and stock exchange, fail to retain their significance after 
controlling for other variables. We control for state provisions that 
require shareholder approval to change the maximum number of 
directors following the issuance of shares with the indicator variable 
State_rule. We find that State_rule significantly affects the probability 
that a firm will ask for shareholder approval of board appointments. 
Past performance, measured as the abnormal Q in the year prior to 
the private placement, is not significantly related to the decision to ask 
for shareholder approval. 10  
Models 10 and 11 include a modified version of our standardized 
measure of Jensen (1986) free cash flow, Freecash_assets1. 
Freecash_assets1 is equal to zero when free cash flows are negative 
and it is equal to Freecash_assets when free cash flows are positive. 
Since, as presented in Table 2, about half of our sample firms have 
negative cash flows, this modification allows a better estimation of the 
potential agency conflicts and entrenchment within our sample firms. 
If firms bypass shareholder approval because they need to accelerate 
the receipt of external funding, the coefficient of Freecash_assets1 
should be positive. If free cash flow, however, measures managerial 
entrenchment while firms with greater entrenchment tend to bypass 
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shareholder approval, the coefficient should be negative. Our result is 
consistent with the entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses. Even 
after controlling for the type of security issued (Common and 
Preferred), state provisions (State_rule), and the shareholder approval 
of the security issued privately (Secur_approval), the two 
entrenchment variables, Insiderchair and Freecash/assets1, are still 
significantly related to the firm's decision to ask shareholders to 
approve the appointment of directors in connection with the private 
placement. 11  
We estimate the economic significance of each coefficient for 
model 11, the most comprehensive, as the change in the probability 
that a firm will seek shareholder approval when the variable increases 
from the 25th to the 75th percentile (or from zero to one for indicator 
variables) while all other variables retain their median values. The 
probability of seeking shareholder approval decreases by 2.16% when 
Freecash/assets1 increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile. 
Insiderchair demonstrates a stronger economic significance. The 
probability of asking for shareholder approval for a firm in which one of 
the top managers is also the chairman is 16.8% lower compared to a 
firm in which the board chairman is an outsider. Among the control 
variables, State_rule is most economically significant. The probability 
of seeking shareholder approval for board appointments is 35.5% 
higher when the applicable state law requires shareholders to approve 
an increase in board size.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 3 are consistent with the 
entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses. We find that firms in which 
the board chairman is a company manager and for which Jensen's 
(1986) free cash flow is higher, are more likely to circumvent 
shareholder approval. The test presented in Table 3 cannot distinguish 
between the entrenchment and monitoring hypotheses since both 
predict weak internal monitoring prior to private placements with 
board appointments without shareholder approval. The analysis 
reported in the following sections, however, allow us to further 
examine the relative validity of these two hypotheses.  
 
6. Monitoring quality of appointed directors  
In this section we directly test our three hypotheses by 
comparing the identities and activities of the directors appointed at the 
time of the private placement regardless of shareholder approval 
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status. The entrenchment hypothesis differs from the approval 
irrelevance and monitoring hypotheses in its prediction regarding the 
monitoring provided by the appointed directors. The entrenchment 
hypothesis argues that firms with entrenched managers will tend to 
appoint directors who support managers' decisions and do not provide 
effective monitoring. To appoint such directors, management is likely 
to bypass shareholder approval. According to the approval irrelevance 
hypothesis, the quality of the newly appointed directors does not 
depend on the firm's decision to seek shareholder approval since 
managers are certain that shareholders, if asked, will automatically 
approve management's nominees regardless of their characteristics. 
Finally, the monitoring hypothesis predicts that firms that bypass 
shareholders' approval will increase the board's monitoring quality. 
This hypothesis contends that private investors demand immediate 
board representation to prevent managerial exploitation of corporate 
resources.  
We measure the monitoring effectiveness of the appointed 
directors by determining how many appointed directors are 
independent, if they assume the board chairmanship, and their 
membership on board committees. As indicated by several studies, 
independent directors monitor managers more effectively and better 
represent shareholders' interests. Weisbach (1988) finds that the 
number of independent directors is positively related to the likelihood 
of removal of poorly performing CEOs, while Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
show that tender offers are characterized by higher bidder returns 
when the board has a majority of independent directors. Brickley et al. 
(1994) find that the market reacts positively when firms with a board 
dominated by outsiders adopt a poison pill. Although a few firms in our 
sample appoint new managers or managers of their own subsidiaries 
to their board at the time of the private placement, the great majority 
of these directors are either gray or independent. Gray directors 
include relatives of top managers and outsiders with disclosed outside 
business dealings with the company.12 We measure both the number 
of independent directors appointed (Independent), and the ratio of the 
number of independent appointed directors to the size of the board 
after the placement (Fraction_ind). This latter measure allows us to 
assess the aggregate decisional influence that the new independent 
directors might have on the board.  
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Since entrenched boards are less likely to delegate power to 
new outside constituents, the appointment of one of the new directors 
as chairman of the board, particularly if the director is independent, is 
symptomatic of less entrenchment Jensen (1993) argues that when 
the CEO rather than an independent director holds the board 
chairmanship, the board ceases being an effective internal monitoring 
device. Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover 
to firm performance is significantly lower in firms where the same 
individual holds both the CEO and chairman position. In our analysis 
we create an independent variable equal to one when one of the 
appointed directors is also appointed chairman of the board (Chair), 
and an independent variable equal to one when one of the 
independent appointed directors is also appointed chairman of the 
board (Inc_chair).  
Membership by the newly appointed directors on board 
committees is another measure of corporate governance quality. 
Membership on board committees can be viewed as a proxy for 
monitoring intensity since board monitoring is a function not only of 
the composition of the board as a whole, but also of the structure and 
composition of the board committees. Kesner (1988) observes that 
most important board decisions originate at the committee level. Klein 
(1998) finds that overall board composition is unrelated to firm 
performance, but that the structure of the compensation and audit 
committees does impact performance. To measure the role that 
appointed directors play on board committees, we measure the 
fraction of all committee seats, audit committee seats, and 
compensation committee seats that are filled by the appointed 
directors.  
Table 4 provides a set of descriptive univariate statistics for the 
appointed directors. Firms that bypass shareholder approval appoint 
on average 1.14 independent directors while firms seeking shareholder 
approval appoint an average of 1.87 independent directors. The 
difference in these means is significant at the 1% level. The ratio of 
the number of independent appointed directors to the board size 
averages 0.15 for the subsample of firms that bypass shareholder 
approval, but 0.24 for the subsample of firms that seek it. This 
difference is also significant at the 1% level. We find that firms asking 
for shareholder approval are more likely to appoint one of the new 
directors as board chairman, particularly when we exclude gray 
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directors. Only 5% of the firms in the "no-approval" subsample 
appoint a new independent director as chairman while 17% of the 
firms in the "approval" subsample appoint a new independent director 
as chairman. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The difference in the proportion of total committee, audit committee, 
and compensation committee seats filled by appointed directors 
between the two subsamples is not significant  
As shown in Section 5, firms with an insider as chairman and 
firms with larger amounts of free cash flow are more likely to bypass 
shareholder approval of board appointments at the time of the private 
placement To verify if the firm's decision to bypass shareholder 
approval is related to the appointment of passive directors even after 
controlling for other measures of managerial entrenchment, we 
independently regress Fraction_ind and Inc_chair on the approval 
indicator variable and several proxies for the quality of corporate 
governance. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, firms that ask for 
shareholder approval tend to appoint a larger number of private 
investor representatives to the board. Since this factor might drive the 
significant differences we observe in Table 4, we also control for the 
number of directors appointed.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the regression in 
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the number of appointed 
independent directors to the total number of directors. Since several 
firms fail to appoint any independent directors, the dependent variable 
of the regression reported in Panel A is left-censored at zero. We 
estimate a Tobit regression to account for the censoring of the 
dependent variable. The approval indicator variable is positive and 
significant even after controlling for firm size (Lnassets), and 
governance variables. When we control for the number of directors 
appointed (column 4 and 5) the approval indicator variable remains 
statistically significant. The size of the board before the placement 
(Board_size) is significantly negative at the 1% level. This variable is 
significant because board size prior to the private placement is 
positively correlated with board size after the placement, which is the 
denominator of the dependent variable. Past performance, measured 
as the abnormal Q in the year prior to the placement, is negative and 
significantly related to the fraction of appointed independent directors.  
This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1998).  
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Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of a probit regression in 
which the dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one 
when one of the appointed independent directors is also appointed 
chairman of the board. The approval indicator variable is significantly 
positive at the 5% level even after controlling for firm size (Lnassets), 
governance variables, and the number of directors appointed.  
Overall, the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 support the 
entrenchment hypothesis. Firms that circumvent shareholder approval 
are more likely to appoint directors supportive of management and 
unlikely to offer meaningful monitoring. Our result that firms with 
entrenched management are more likely to bypass shareholders to 
appoint fewer independent directors is also consistent with Shivdasani 
and Yermack (1999).  
 
7. Market reaction at the time of the 
announcement  
Our three hypotheses predict different market reactions to the 
announcement of board appointments in connection with a private 
placement. If the avoidance of shareholder approval is a manifestation 
of agency problems, then the announcement of board appointments 
conditional on shareholder approval should signal less entrenchment. 
Consequently, such announcements should be received positively in 
the marketplace. Alternatively, if voting by shareholders is irrelevant, 
shareholder approval should have no effect on stock market returns 
surrounding the announcement of such appointments. Finally, if 
shareholders are bypassed to allow the immediate appointment of new 
monitors to the board, then the market should not react more 
positively to the announcement of board appointments conditional of 
shareholder approval. 
 
7.1. Announcement period returns  
To ensure consistency in the information content of the 
announcements, we eliminate from our sample ten firms that 
announce the private placement and director appointments on 
different days. We calculate abnormal returns around the 
announcement date by estimating the market model over the day-300 
to day-46 window relative to the announcement date. The market 
return is proxied by the CRSP equally-weighted market index. Table 6 
presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for a two-
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day period beginning at the announcement date (0,1), a three-day 
period centered around the announcement date (-1,1), and a five-day 
period spanning days-2 through day+2. Since Factiva reports 
announcements with the date and time at which they were originally 
released, we believe that the (0,1) interval provides results with the 
least potential to be affected by confounding events.  
Panel A of Table 6 presents the CAARs for all the firms 
announcing board appointments in connection with a private offering. 
Consistent with the event studies on private placements by Wruck 
(1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993), the CAARs are positive and 
statistically significant for all three examination windows. The 
magnitude of these CAARs, however, is larger than those of previous 
studies. The difference might be attributable to different samples since 
we examine placements of common stock as well as hybrid securities. 
Additionally, all of our sample offerings are associated with board 
appointments, and none of the securities are placed with the issuing 
firm's managers.  
The CAARs for the non-approval and approval subsamples 
reported in panels B and C provide preliminary evidence that firms 
announcing board appointments conditional on shareholder approval 
are associated with larger abnormal announcement returns. For the 
(0,1) window, the cumulative abnormal return for the approval 
subsample is 8.27% while that for the non-approval subsample is 
4.96%.  
To isolate the effect of circumvention of shareholder approval on 
market returns from the other information contained in the security 
issuance announcement, we control for a set of variables associated 
with capital raising by estimating a series of OLS regressions with the 
cumulative abnormal returns for the (0,1) window as the dependent 
variable. We provide the results of these regressions in Table 7. When 
the approval-of-directors indicator variable (Approval) is the only 
independent variable, its coefficient is positive and large in magnitude, 
but not significant. When the security approval indicator variable 
(Secur_approval) is introduced into the model, the approval of 
directors becomes statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
security approval indicator is negative and statistically significant. As 
discussed in Section 3, in many cases firms ask for shareholder 
approval of the security issuance when the listing exchange requires 
them to do so. Moreover, shareholder approval of the security 
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issuance is sometimes associated with amendments in the charter that 
can be deleterious to shareholders. For example, firms that ask 
shareholders to approve the issuance of preferred convertible shares 
might also amend the charter to include a blank check preferred stock 
provision. This provision can be used as a takeover defense since it 
allows the implementation of poison pills without shareholder approval, 
and therefore it might be negatively received by the market. The 
introduction of anti-takeover amendments explains, at least partially, 
the sign of the coefficient for Secur_approval.13  
The announcement of a private placement associated with board 
appointments also provides investors with information about the 
identity of the new directors and a possible change in board size. To 
control for the potential effect of this additional information on 
announcement returns, in column (3) of Table 7 we include as 
regressors the fraction of newly appointed independent directors 
(Fraction_ind) and the change in board size (Board_size_change). 
These two variables are not significant; however, the director approval 
indicator variable remains significant at the 5% level. The director 
approval indicator variable remains significant even after the 
introduction of firms size, the level of free cash flow and several 
control variables associated with the private offering such as the 
fraction of shares placed, the type of security placed, the change in the 
ownership by officers, directors, and outside blockholders due to the 
private placement, whether the private purchaser is a corporation, and 
state provisions. In the reported regressions we consider the fraction 
of stock owned by firms managed or owned by directors as part of 
directors' stock ownership. When we consider that fraction as owned 
by outside blockholders, our results do not significantly change.  
 
7.2. Discounted adjusted abnormal returns  
Wruck (1989) observes that private equity is usually sold at a 
discount to compensate the purchaser for positively contributing to 
firm value or for maintaining managerial entrenchment. Consequently, 
the abnormal return observed around the announcement of a private 
placement must be adjusted for this component representing 
compensation to the private purchaser. To measure the abnormal 
return due only to the information revealed to the market, we use the 
model developed by Bradley and Wakeman (1983) and applied by 
Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) to calculate the discount-
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adjusted abnormal returns (DAAR). Since the Bradley and Wakeman 
model applies only to common stock placements, we calculate DAAR 
for only the 67 firms of our sample that place common stock to private 
investors and announce the private offering and appointment of 
directors on the same day.14  
As shown in Panel A of Table 8, the discount-adjusted abnormal 
returns for our subsample of common stock private placements is 
large (11.60%) and statistically significant. The DAAR for the six firms 
that seek shareholder approval of board appointments is very large 
(38.8%) and significantly higher than the DAAR of the firms that 
bypass shareholder approval. We further analyze the effect of 
shareholder approval of directorships on discount-adjusted abnormal 
returns by estimating an OLS regression with DAAR as the dependent 
variable. Panel B of Table 8 contains the results. The director approval 
variable is significantly positive at the 5% level even after the 
introduction of the control variables used in Table 7.  
Overall, this event study analysis shows that the market 
strongly rewards firms that submit their director candidates for 
shareholder approval. This result is consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis. The market reacts positively to the announcement of 
shareholder approval because it infers a lower level of entrenchment 
and consequently revises its estimations of the firm's future cash 
flows.  
 
8. Does shareholder approval impact 
performance?  
The entrenchment hypothesis predicts that firms seeking 
shareholder approval perform better than firms bypassing shareholder 
approval since the firm's decision to ask for shareholder approval is a 
manifestation of better corporate governance. Alternatively, the 
approval irrelevance hypothesis predicts that the approval of 
directorships does not affect the firm's future performance. Finally, the 
monitoring hypothesis predicts that companies bypass shareholder 
approval to grant immediate board representation to private investors 
who wish to monitor the company. Therefore, firms that bypass 
shareholder approval, ceteris paribus, might improve performance 
relative to those firms that seek shareholder approval. We examine 
both the firms' operating and stock performance following private 
placements associated with board appointments to determine what 
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impact the level of managerial entrenchment implied by the 
approval/non-approval of these appointments has on the firm's 
performance.  
 
8.1. Operating performance  
We estimate abnormal operating performance by using the Lie 
(2001) modification of the Barber and Lyon (1996) method as applied 
by Grullon and Michaely (2004). The abnormal operating performance 
is calculated as the operating performance of the sample firm minus 
the operating performance of the matching firm. Our measure of 
operating performance is operating income before depreciation scaled 
by the average of the beginning-period and ending-period book value 
of total assets (ROA). We select matching firms that have the same 
industry classification as the sample firms and are comparable in their 
level of performance during the year preceding the private issue (year-
1), their change in performance from year-2 to year-1, and their 
market-to-book ratio for year-1.  
The results from this analysis are not tabulated, but available 
upon request from the authors. Our aggregate sample of firms that 
appoint directors in connection with a private offering significantly 
underperform in the fiscal year including the private issue date. This 
result is consistent with the evidence offered by Hertzel et al. (2002). 
The abnormal operating performance for the approval subsample is 
significantly positive in all three years following the private offering. 
Most importantly, when we compare the approval/non-approval 
subsamples we find that the difference of the medians in year one, the 
difference of the means in year two, and both the difference of the 
means and medians in year three are positive and significant. This 
result reveals that firms that seek shareholder approval of board 
appointments at the time of the private placement perform 
significantly better in the three years following the offering than firms 
that bypass shareholder approval. The significant difference in 
performance between the two approval subsamples is consistent with 
the entrenchment and monitoring hypothesis.  
 
8.2. Stock performance  
8.2.1. Buy-and-hold abnormal returns  
We calculate BHARs for the first 3 years following the 
announcement of private placements by matching each firm in our 
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sample to a matching firm by size and book-to-market ratio as 
suggested by Barber and Lyon (1997). Consistent with Hertzel et al. 
(2002), the BHARs following private placements are negative and large 
in magnitude. The difference in the BHARs between the approval and 
non-approval sub-samples, however, is statistically insignificant.  
When we consider the BHARs at the end of the first, second, 
and third year following the private placement, we find that the stocks 
of firms asking for shareholder approval of directorships significantly 
outperform those of firms that bypass shareholder approval. The mean 
of the difference between the one-year BHARs of the approval/non-
approval subsamples as well as the corresponding difference for the 
three-year BHARs are statistically significant.  
 
8.2.2. Calendar-time abnormal returns  
As noted by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), the 
buy-and-hold method does not account for cross-sectional dependence 
in returns. We address this issue by also estimating three-year 
abnormal returns using the calendar-time approach. For each calendar 
month in our sample period, we form a portfolio of the sample firms 
that have announced a private placement during the last 36 months. 
We exclude those months with less than ten firms in the portfolio. We 
then regress the monthly portfolio excess returns on the three Fama 
and French (1993) factors.  
The calendar-time regression indicates that the three-year 
abnormal return is -10.58%. The three-year abnormal return for the 
non-approval sample and approval sample are -17.65% and +27.98%, 
respectively. To investigate if the difference of the portfolio abnormal 
returns for the two approval subsamples is significant, we regress the 
difference in the monthly portfolio excess returns for the two 
subsamples on the three Fama and French (1993) factors. The 
difference of the three-year abnormal returns for the two subsamples 
is large, (73.36%), but insignificant. 15  
 
8.3. Long-term performance and announcement 
returns  
Overall, the long-term performance results are consistent with 
the entrenchment hypothesis. The difference in the abnormal 
operating performance between the two approval subsamples is 
significant in the 3 years following the private placement. Even though 
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the buy-and-hold stock returns are partially suggestive of a difference 
in the long-term stock performance between the approval/non-
approval subsamples, when we control for cross-sectional dependence 
in returns with the calendar time portfolio method, the statistical 
significance vanishes. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical significance 
in the difference of long-term stock performance between the two 
subsamples does not contradict the entrenchment hypothesis. In an 
efficient market, the increase in share price should occur when a firm 
announces the decision to seek shareholder approval and not gradually 
in the following years.  
 
9. Conclusions  
This paper investigates the causes and consequences of the 
appointment of directors to corporate boards without shareholder 
approval in the context of private placements. We show that firms with 
greater managerial entrenchment are more likely to bypass 
shareholder approval for their appointments. Such firms are also less 
likely to appoint independent directors or to elect one of the appointed 
directors as chairman of the board. Moreover, the stock market reacts 
more positively to the announcement of the private offering when the 
firm submits the board candidates for shareholder approval. Finally, 
firms that bypass shareholder approval underperform compared to 
firms that obtain shareholder approval.  
Overall, the results of this study are consistent with recent 
findings by Wu (2004) and Barclay et al. (2007-this issue) that 
challenge the conventional view of private placements as enhancing 
the quality of monitoring. Although there are multiple reasons for the 
private placement of securities, our findings indicate that 
entrenchment has a stronger influence on the private placement 
process than previously believed.  
Our results are also consistent with the view that entrenched 
managers are likely to nominate directors that protect managers' 
positions and interests. Since such directors do not represent the 
interests of outside shareholders, entrenched managers will adopt 
strategies that allow them to appoint "friendly" directors without 
asking for shareholder approval.  
The current process for soliciting shareholder approval of board 
appointments surrounding private placements is not fully consistent 
with effective corporate governance. The various stratagems that 
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managers can adopt to avoid shareholder approval neutralize the 
monitoring provided by shareholder voting. Our findings align with the 
observations of Bebchuck (2005) who argues that "shareholders' 
existing power to replace directors is insufficient to secure the 
adoption of value-increasing governance arrangements that 
management disfavors." Indeed, those firms that could benefit the 
most from the monitoring provided by shareholder approval are those 
most likely to avoid it.  
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Therefore it is plausible that managers expect the probability of 
shareholders rejecting management slate to be greater than 
zero.  
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 6 See Rule 312.03 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual, Nasdaq 
Marketplace Rule 4350(i), and Section 713 of the AMEX 
Company Guide.  
 7 See MBCA sec. 10.20; DGCL sec. 109. Only a few states, 
including California, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia, 
require shareholder approval to change the maximum number 
of directors following share issuance. We control for such a 
provision in our multivariate analysis.  
 8 Bajaj et al. (2000) report that 22% of all securities fraud class 
action law suits during the 1991-1999 period are claims of 
breaches of fiduciary responsibility. The Stanford University 
Security Class Action Clearinghouse serves as an authoritative 
source of data regarding such litigation. It reports for 2005 that 
93% of the cases filed in 2005 were due to Section 10b-5 
(untrue statements and fraud), Section 11 (false registration 
statements) or Section 12(2) (false statements in prospectuses 
or other communications). Such claims are often then linked 
with breaches of fiduciary responsibilities by directors or 
corporate managers.  
 9 We obtain similar results when we substitute this variable with 
Ceochair, an indicator variable equal to one when the CEO is 
also the chairman of the board.  
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 10 When we substitute abnormal Q with an industry-normed 
ROA, we obtain similar results.  
 11 In unreported regressions we also estimate the effect of a 
CEO tenure variable, and of an indicator equal to one when the 
CEO is the founder of the firm. The coefficients of these 
variables are not significant.  
 12 The private investment is not considered a business dealing 
by itself. Private investors who are appointed to the board are 
classified as independent if they do not have other business 
connections with the issuer.  
 13 The negative coefficient of Secur_approval does not mean 
that the reaction of the announcement of a private placement 
that requires shareholder approval is negative, but only that is 
less positive since the unconditional abnormal return is larger in 
magnitude than the Secur_approval coefficient.  
 14 Some of these firms also place hybrid securities additionally 
to common shares. We control for this in the OLS regressions 5 
and 6 reported in Panel B of Table 8.  
 15 When we calculate calendar-time abnormal returns using the 
correction proposed by Shumway (1997) and Shumway and 
Warther (1999) for companies which delist, the results are not 
significantly different.  
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Appendix A. Description of variables 
The variables are reported in alphabetical order 
Variable Definition 
Age Number of years from the CRSP listing date to the 
offering date 
Alliance Indicator variable equal to one when the private investor 
is a corporation 
Approval Indicator variable equal to one when the firm appoints 
directors with shareholder approval 
Assets Total assets of the firm expressed in millions of dollars 
calculated at the end of the fiscal year preceding the 
private placement 
Audit Proportion of audit committee seats filled by the 
directors appointed in connection with the private 
placement 
Board_size Size of the board before the private placement 
Board_size_change Difference between board size after the placement and 
board size before the placement divided by the board 
size before the placement 
Ceochair Indicator variable that is equal to one when the chief 
executive officer of the firm is also the chairman of the 
board before the private placement 
Chair Indicator variable equal to one when one of the directors 
appointed in connection with the private placement is 
also appointed chairman of the board 
Committee Proportion of committee seats filled by the directors 
appointed in connection with the private placement 
Common Indicator variable equal to one when the company issues 
common stock 
Compensation Proportion of compensation committee seats filled by the 
directors appointed in connection with the private 
placement 
Delta_block_own Difference of outside blockholder stock ownership before 
and after the private placement 
Delta_offdir_own Difference of directors' and officers' stock ownership 
before and after the private placement 
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Dir_appointed Number of directors appointed at the time of the private 
placement 
Founder Indicator variable that is equal to one when the CEO is 
also one of the founders of the firm 
Fraction_ind Number of independent directors appointed divided by 
the board size after the placement 
Fraction_placed Portion of common stock of the firm distributed through 
the private placement (after conversion of preferred 
shares, convertible notes, and warrants) 
Freecash/assets Operating income before depreciation, minus income 
taxes corrected for the annual change in deferred taxes, 
minus interest expense on debt, minus dividends on 
preferred stock and common stock, all divided by the 
value of total assets 
Freecash/assets1 Equal to Freecash/assets if Freecash/assets > 0 and 
equal to 0 if Freecash/assets ≤ 0 
Ind_chair Indicator variable equal to one when one of the 
independent directors appointed in connection with the 
private placement is also appointed chairman of the 
board 
Independent Number of independent directors appointed in 
connection with the private placement 
Insider_own Share ownership of officers and directors before the 
private placement 
Insiderchair Indicator variable that is equal to one when one of the 
top managers of the firm is also the chairman of the 
board before the private placement 
Insiders Number of insiders on the board divided by board size 
before the placement 
Inst_own Institutional share ownership before the private 
placement 
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets calculated at the end 
of the fiscal year preceding the private placement 
Lnassets Natural logarithm of Assets 
Marketcap Market capitalization of the firm on the day of the 
announcement of the private placement expressed in 
millions of dollars 
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NYSE Indicator variable equal to one when the firm's common 
stock is traded on the New York Stock Exchange 
Preferred Indicator variable equal to one when the company issues 
convertible preferred stock 
Proceed Size of the offering expressed in millions of dollars 
Q Ratio of the market value of equity minus the book value 
of equity plus the book value of assets to the book value 
of assets calculated at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the private placement 
Qabn Q of the firm before the private placement corrected by 
the median industry Q 
Rel_ceo_tenure Ratio between the years of CEO tenure and the years 
from the incorporation of the company to the issue 
Ret-ew-1 Buy-and-hold abnormal return for the year preceding 
the private issue calculated by subtracting the monthly 
return of the CRSP equally-weighted index from the 
monthly return of the firm's stock 
ROA Return on assets calculated at the end of the fiscal year 
preceding the private placement 
Secur_approval Indicator variable equal to one when the company asks 
for shareholder approval of the security issuance 
State_rule Indicator variable equal to one when the state of 
incorporation requires shareholder approval to change 
the maximum number of directors allowed after the 
issuance of shares 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution and homogeneity tests of sample firms across market, 
issuance, and governance characteristics 
 Full No-App App 
Panel A: exchange 
NYSE 24 14 10 
(13.3) (9.5) (29.4) 
AMEX 20 18 2 
(11.1) (12.2) (5.9) 
NASDAQ 135 113 22 
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 Full No-App App 
(74.6) (76.9) (64.7) 
OTC 2 2 0 
(1.1) (1.4) (0.0) 
Fisher test p-value  0.017 
 
Panel B: security 
Common 71 67 4 
(38.4) (44.7) (11.4) 
Convertible preferred 78 56 22 
(42.2) (37.3) (62.9) 
Convertible notes 27 21 6 
(14.6) (14.0) (17.1) 
Loan 1 1 0 
(0.5) (0.7) (0.0) 
Combinations 8 5 3 
(4.3) (3.3) (8.6) 
Fisher test p-value  0.002 
 
Panel C: security approval 
No 119 110 9 
(65.7) (74.8) (26.5) 
Yes 62 37 25 
(34.3) (25.2) (73.5) 
Fisher test p-value  < 0.001 
 
Panel D: investors 
Corporations 36 29 7 
(19.4) (19.4) (20.0) 
Individuals 8 7 1 
(4.3) (4.7) (2.9) 
Investment firms 111 90 21 
(60.0) (60.0) (60.0) 
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 Full No-App App 
Investment firms and individuals 30 24 6 
(16.2) (16.0) (17.1) 
Fisher test p-value  0.970  
 
Panel E: directors appointed 
1 91 80 11 
(49.2) (53.3) (31.4) 
2 55 44 11 
(29.7) (29.3) (31.4) 
3 17 10 7 
(9.2) (6.7) (20.0) 
4 15 10 5 
(8.1) (6.7) (14.3) 
≥ 5 7 6 1 
 (3.9) (4.0) (2.9) 
Fisher test p-value  0.034  
 
Panel F: impact on board size 
Addition 117 98 19 
(63.2) (65.3) (54.3) 
Replacement 52 40 12 
(28.1) (26.7) (34.3) 
Mixed 16 12 4 
(8.6) (8.0) (11.4) 
Fisher test p-value  0.468  
“Full” refers to a sample of 181 U.S. firms that appoint directors in combination with 
private offerings between 1995 and 2000. “No-App” refers to the subsample of firms 
that appoint directors without shareholder approval, and “App” refers to the 
subsample of firms that appoint directors with shareholder approval. The percentage 
of firms in each group is reported in parenthesis. The p-values for Fisher's exact tests 
of homogeneity between the two approval subsamples are reported at the bottom of 
each panel. 
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Table 2. Firm characteristics, issue characteristics, governance, and past 
performance variables for the full sample, the subsample formed by firms that 
appoint directors without shareholder approval (“No-App”), and that with 
shareholder approval (“App”) 
 Full 
sample 






Panel A: firm characteristics 
Assets 217.0 165.6 438.9 273.3 2.45 0.019 
(47.3) (37.0) (142.4) (105.4) (2.45) (0.014) 
Marketcap 182.8 185.5 154.0 − 31.51 − 0.47 0.643 
(53.4) (45.5) (77.8) (32.3) (1.85) (0.065) 
Age 6.17 5.75 7.97 2.22 1.60 0.117 
(4.14) (4.02) (6.01) (1.98) (1.64) (0.100) 
Freecash/assets − 0.23 − 0.22 − 0.27 − 0.055 − 0.50 0.623 
(− 0.04) (− 0.05) (− 0.04) (0.01) (− 0.03) (0.974) 
Leverage 0.29 0.28 0.33 0.052 1.29 0.204 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.29) (0.06) (1.11) (0.269) 
 
Panel B: issue characteristics 
Fraction_placed 0.26 0.24 0.32 0.08 2.53 0.012 
(0.20) (0.19) (0.31) (0.12) (3.02) (0.003) 
Proceed 46.74 42.56 64.81 22.24 0.80 0.424 
(10.00) (9.60) (27.50) (17.90) (3.04) (0.003) 
Dir_appointed 1.89 1.79 2.32 0.53 2.43 0.016 
(2) (1) (2) (1) (2.83) (0.005) 
Board_size_change 0.25 0.24 0.29 0.043 1.46 0.147 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.25) (0.05) −2.17 (0.030) 
 
Panel C: governance 
Board_size 6.53 6.39 7.12 0.72 1.92 0.057 
(6) (6) (7) (1) (2.12) (0.034) 
Ceochair 0.54 0.57 0.41 − 0.16 2.84 0.092 
na na na na na na 
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Insiderchair 0.68 0.73 0.47 − 0.26 8.40 0.004 
na na na na na na 
Insiders 0.32 0.33 0.27 − 0.06 − 1.68 0.095 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.25) (− 0.04) (− 2.00) (0.046) 
Founder 0.33 0.31 0.41 0.10 1.22 0.269 
na na na na na na 
Insider_own 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.01 0.46 0.643 
(0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.02) (0.56) (0.575) 
Inst_own 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.09 1.84 0.074 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.23) (0.11) (1.61) (0.117) 
 
Panel D: past performance 
Q 2.86 3.04 2.07 − 0.97 − 1.65 0.102 
(1.50) (1.60) (1.20) (− 0.40) (−2.43) (0.015) 
Qabn 1.02 1.13 0.58 − 0.55 − 0.98 0.328 
(− 0.06) (− 0.03) (− 0.15) (− 0.11) (− 0.78) (0.436) 
ROA − 0.31 − 0.17 − 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.962 
(− 0.03) (− 0.04) (− 0.01) (0.03) (− 0.26) (0.795) 
Ret-ew-1 − 0.17 − 0.14 − 0.30 − 0.16 − 0.70 0.485 
(− 0.55) (− 0.55) (− 0.56) (− 0.01) (− 0.15) (0.877) 
The table presents the t-statistics and p-values of the difference of the means, and the 
Wilcoxon z-statistics and p-values of the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney non-parametric 
test. For indicator variables we report chi-square statistics and its corresponding p-
values. Statistically significant differences, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are 
reported in bold. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Table 3. Determinants of shareholder approval — probit regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Intercept − 1.266 − 1.774 − 1.668 − 1.884 − 1.711 − 1.708 − 1.706 − 1.737 − 1.587 − 1.709 − 1.588 
(0.042) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (< .0001) (< 0.001) (< 0.001) (0.001) 
Board_size − 0.010 0.002 − 0.006 − 0.021        
(0.873) (0.979) (0.924) (0.759)        
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Insiders − 0.545  − 0.065 0.084        
(0.489)  (0.403) (0.921)        
Insiderchair − 0.650 − 0.631 − 0.805 − 0.985 − 0.798 − 0.811 − 0.806 − 0.804 − 0.794 − 0.789 − 0.790 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (< 0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Insider_ownership 0.867 1.024          
(0.187) (0.136)          
Rel_ceo_tenure  − 0.0591          
 (0.136)          
Freecash/assets1          − 1.798 − 2.016 
         (0.082) (0.096) 
Lnassets 0.193 0.178 0.191 0.250 0.167 0.188 0.197 0.186 0.144 0.202 0.164 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.025) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.053) (0.002) (0.035) 
Fraction_placed   1.994  2.003 1.991 1.998 1.841 1.899 1.952 1.116 
  (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.040) (0.007) (0.005) (0.162) 
State_rule    1.028       1.318 
   (0.010)       (0.002) 
Inst_ownership     0.004       
    (0.979)       
Qabn      − 0.005      
     (0.866)      
Leverage       − 0.106     
      (0.826)     
Directors_appointed        0.035    
       (0.775)    
NYSE         0.428   
        (0.231)   
Common           − 0.817 
          (0.039) 
Preferred           0.057 
          (0.854) 
Secur_approval           0.618 
          (0.002) 
Goodness of fit 1.10 1.10 1.19 1.21 1.19 1.18 1.15 1.17 1.20 1.22 1.33 
Log-likelihood − 78.1 − 77.1 − 75.0 − 71.8 − 74.8 − 75.0 − 75.0 − 74.9 − 74.3 − 74.7 − 64.2 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to one when the firm asks 
for shareholder approval to appoint representatives of the private investors to the 
board. Comparable to Palia (2001) and Fama and French (2002) we set the missing 
observations of Compustat variables to zero and use indicator variables that are set to 
unity for the missing observations. Goodness of fit is calculated as in McIntosh and 
Dorfman (1992). The p-values of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis. 
Statistically significant coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported 
in bold. All independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Independent 151 1.14 1 30 1.87 2 0.73 0.002 1 0.004 
Fraction_ind 151 0.15 0.14 30 0.24 0.22 0.08 0.005 0.08 0.011 
Chair 145 0.09 na 30 0.20 na 0.11 0.089 na na 
Ind_chair 145 0.05 na 30 0.17 na 0.12 0.025 na na 
Committee 139 0.21 0.20 29 0.23 0.24 0.02 0.546 0.04 0.355 
Audit 139 0.22 0.25 29 0.21 0.33 − 0.01 0.898 0.08 0.859 
Compensation 139 0.19 0.00 29 0.21 0.25 0.02 0.748 0.25 0.580 
The p-values refer to two-sample t-tests for the mean, Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney non-parametric tests for the median, and chi-square 
tests for indicator variables (i.e., Chair and Ind_chair). Statistically 
significant differences, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are 
reported in bold. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Table 5. Monitoring role of appointed directors — multivariate analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: fraction of independent appointed directors 
 





(0.013) (0.013) (0.006) 
Approval 0.101 0.117 0.119 0.085 0.080 0.076 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014) (0.032) (0.046) 
Lnassets  − 0.005 0.002 − 0.003 − 0.003 − 0.007 
 (0.523) (0.787) (0.732) (0.709) (0.400) 
Insidechair  0.052 0.043 0.035 0.035 0.037 
 (0.103) (0.165) (0.212) (0.204) (0.192) 
Freecash/assets
1 
 − 0.199 − 0.258 − 0.209 − 0.203 − 0.211 
 (0.496) (0.373) (0.415) (0.429) (0.408) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: fraction of independent appointed directors 
 
  (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Number_appoin
ted 
   0.061 0.061 0.060 






Secur_approval     0.013 0.023 
    (0.669) (0.454) 
Q_abn      − 0.00
6 
     (0.099) 
State_rule      − 0.015 
     (0.731) 
Log-likelihood − 15.32 − 12.00 − 9.02 5.02 5.08 6.53 
 






















Approval 0.629 0.846 0.842 0.747 0.948 0.943 
(0.050) (0.021) (0.021) (0.049) (0.031) (0.043) 
Lnassets  − 0.060 − 0.068 − 0.079 − 0.071 − 0.094 
 (0.465) (0.444) (0.374) (0.428) (0.355) 
Insidechair  0.482 0.491 0.463 0.428 0.415 
 (0.199) (0.193) (0.239) (0.283) (0.310) 
Freecash/assets
1 
 1.596 1.633 1.853 1.382 1.423 
 (0.576) (0.568) (0.536) (0.655) (0.658) 
Board_size   0.019 − 0.004 − 0.004 0.004 
  (0.815) (0.961) (0.963) (0.963) 
   0.248 0.268 0.272 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




   (0.029) (0.021) (0.020) 
Secur_approval     − 0.408 − 0.386 
    (0.319) (0.359) 
Q_abn      − 0.065 
     (0.484) 
State_rule      − 0.010 
     (0.985) 
Goodness of fit 1.00 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 
Log-likelihood − 44.56 − 41.31 − 41.21 − 39.08 − 38.55 − 38.22 
Panel A presents the coefficients of a Tobit regression in which the dependent variable 
is the number of independent appointed directors divided by the board size after the 
placement. Panel B presents the coefficients of a probit regression in which the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one when one of the independent 
directors appointed in connection with the private placement is also appointed 
chairman of the board. Goodness of fit is calculated as in McIntosh and Dorfman 
(1992). The p-values of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis. Statistically 
significant coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. All 
independent variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Table 6. Abnormal announcement returns 
 CAAR (%) Pos:Neg Z SCS Z t 
Panel A: full sample (N = 171) 
(0,1) 5.58 104:67 9.294 4.551 7.765 
(− 2,2) 10.16 115:56 10.430 6.296 8.942 
(− 1,1) 7.48 116:55 9.851 5.689 8.498 
 
Panel B: no-approval sample (N = 139) 
(0,1) 4.96 84:55 7.870 3.766 6.288 
(− 2,2) 10.06 91:48 9.684 5.543 8.068 
(− 1,1) 7.01 94:45 8.616 4.819 7.253 
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 CAAR (%) Pos:Neg Z SCS Z t 
Panel C: approval sample (N = 32) 
(0,1) 8.27 20:12 5.084 2.764 5.607 
(− 2,2) 10.58 24:8 3.926 3.263 4.536 
(− 1,1) 9.53 22:10 4.814 3.247 5.273 
We calculate the abnormal announcement returns by means of a market model with 
an estimation period of 253 days that terminates 46 days before the announcement. 
The full sample is formed only by firms that announce the private placement and 
appointment of directors on the same day. The market returns used in the model are 
the CRSP equally-weighted returns. CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return, 
pos:neg is the number of firms with positive:negative abnormal returns, Z is the z 
statistics of the Patell (1976) test, SCS Z is the z statistics of the Boehmer et al. 
(1991) test, and t is the t-statistic with the time series correction of Brown and Warner 
(1985). 
Table 7. Abnormal announcement returns — OLS regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
0.049 0.064 0.052 0.048 0.047 − 0.010 
(< 0.001) (0.015) (0.020) (0.063) (0.208) (0.843) 
Approval 
0.044 0.063 0.076 0.076 0.066 0.065 
(0.163) (0.058) (0.028) (0.028) (0.060) (0.074) 
Secur_approval 
 − 0.046 − 0.046 − 0.048 − 0.044 − 0.043 
 (0.070) (0.074) (0.070) (0.105) (0.114) 
Fraction_ind 
  0.005 − 0.008 − 0.015 0.016 
  (0.955) (0.927) (0.871) (0.876) 
Board_size_change 
  0.064 0.062 0.076 0.062 
  (0.450) (0.467) (0.382) (0.470) 
Fraction_placed 
   0.031 0.001 − 0.007 
   (0.725) (0.994) (0.946) 
Delta_offdir_own 
    0.041 0.057 
    (0.630) (0.519) 
Delta_inst_own 
    0.065 0.055 
    (0.457) (0.541) 
Lnassets 
    0.002 0.007 
    (0.457) (0.385) 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Common      
0.055 
     (0.103) 
Preferred 
     0.023 
     (0.480) 
Freecash/assets1 
     − 0.213 
     (0.378) 
Alliance 
     0.021 
     (0.542) 
State_rule 
     0.012 
     (0.792) 
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.019 0.017 0.012 0.051 0.024 
The dependent variable is the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for the 
announcement day and the following day (interval [0,1]). The p-values of the 
coefficients are reported in parenthesis. Statistically significant coefficients, at a 
minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. All independent variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
Table 8. Discount-adjusted abnormal returns 
Panel A: univariate analysis 
 
 DAAR t-stat p-value N 
Full 11.60 3.68 0.005 67 
No-app 9.33 3.24 0.002 61 
App 38.82 1.94 0.109 6 
Diff 29.50 2.60 0.012  
 
Panel B: multivariate analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.093 0.107 0.140 0.129 − 0.033 − 0.150 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.078) (0.205) (0.492) 
Approval 0.295 0.323 0.329 0.329 0.333 0.375 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.021) (0.019) 
Secur_approval  − 0.042 − 0.065 − 0.071 − 0.037 − 0.016 
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Panel B: multivariate analysis 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 (0.537) (0.364) (0.351) (0.664) (0.858) 
Fraction_ind   0.310 0.311 0.210 0.068 
  (0.292) (0.293) (0.522) (0.879) 
Dir_change   − 0.309 − 0.314 − 0.244 − 0.154 
  (0.138) (0.137) (0.275) (0.522) 
Fraction_placed    0.065 0.036 − 0.039 
   (0.803) (0.903) (0.896) 
Common     0.121 0.214 
    (0.471) (0.235) 
Delta_offdir_own     0.164 0.197 
    (0.586) (0.533) 
Delta_inst_own     0.261 0.236 
    (0.364) (0.418) 
Lnassets     0.010 0.028 
    (0.675) (0.350) 
Freecash/assets1      − 1.050 
     (0.233) 
Alliance      0.015 
     (0.892) 
State_rule      −0.023 
     (0.814) 
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.103 0.082 0.068 0.020 0.027 
Panel A presents the discount-adjusted abnormal return (DAARs) calculated as in 
Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993). “Full” refers to the full sample, “No-app” 
refers to the subsample of firms that appoint directors without shareholder approval, 
and “App” refers to the subsample of firms that appoint directors with shareholder 
approval. “Diff” is the difference between the DAARs of the two approval subsamples. 
The sample is formed only by firms that privately issue common stock and announce 
the private offering and the board appointments on the same day. Panel B presents 
the coefficients of OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is the DAAR. The 
p-values of the coefficients are reported in parenthesis. Statistically significant 
coefficients, at a minimum 10% confidence level, are reported in bold. All independent 
variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
